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INTRODUCTION
In a 1958 American movie, The Blob, an alien life form begins to
absorb everything in its path. Teenagers, led by a young Steve
McQueen, alert the town to the danger. Unlike the blob, transparency
is neither alien nor to be feared; but like the blob, it is expanding,
becoming larger and more diffuse by incorporating more ideas into
it. At times, like the blob, transparency has become a term that
invokes something difficult to describe.1

* Professor of Law and Allen King Scholar, American University
Washington College of Law.
1. Available definitions fail to capture the complexity of the meaning of the
term. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining transparency as
“lack of guile” and informing that the use of the word is popular in organizational
policies, practices, and lawmaking).
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This article outlines differing justifications for transparency and
their connection with varying views of the administration of laws.
This outline may give some form to the concept of transparency and
help to identify, like the blob, what it now contains. Suggested are
connections between the justifications for transparency and the views
of administration.

I. DIFFERING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
TRANSPARENCY
For purposes of explanation, this article discusses three
justifications for transparency, including (1) transparency and the
effective administration of laws, (2) transparency and open
government and democratic accountability, and (3) transparency and
human rights. Each of these justifications gives different reasons for
transparency provisions. These justifications conflict with one
another, in part, because they require different approaches to
transparency and suggest different roles for transparency in
administration. The examples principally come from freedom of
information and open meeting laws, whistleblower protection, public
financial disclosure, and other governmental ethics regulations. This
article also looks to information disclosure as a type of consumer
protection regulation.

A. TRANSPARENCY AND EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION
Many justifications for transparency relate to how transparency
provisions improve government administration. These provisions can
be seen as instruments to accomplish more effectively a number of
administrative goals,2 though these goals can themselves represent
the diverse and sometimes conflicting values discussed below. The
character of these transparency provisions and the weight given to
them in administration depend upon which values are being pursued.
Furthermore, governments of different countries and administrators
in different types of organizations may subscribe to some but not all
2. See, e.g., Transparency and Open Government Policy: Memorandum for
the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26,
2009) (announcing the Obama Administration’s commitment to increase the U.S.
government’s transparency because “transparency promotes accountability,”
informs citizens about the creation of or changes in laws and policies, and allows
the government to request public feedback).
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of these values. However, as general aspects of administration, many
governments, both democratic and nondemocratic, adopt some
version of them.
Transparency can support bureaucratic and governmental
legitimacy. Most governments, including authoritarian ones, will
perceive a benefit from explaining governmental actions in a way
that connects those actions to the welfare of the state and its subjects.
At the same time, all governments and most organizations exercise
some discretion in determining what will be known and what will be
kept secret.3 Thus, one way of considering transparency in different
legal systems is to address what criteria will be used to exercise that
discretion. Few bureaucracies or governments are likely to publicly
adopt criteria that would seem self-serving in the eyes of its subjects
or clients. Thus, transparency can be seen as a way of supporting
governmental legitimacy.
Transparency can also be viewed as enabling market choices.
First, governments can disseminate government-held information
regarding, for example, product testing, safety standards and
performance, and scientific assessments of the advantages and risks
of different products and services. Similar government-held
information may address financial institutions and services. Such
information allows a more economically efficient allocation of
resources in the market.4 In doing so, governments address one type
3. Leaders of democratic as well as non-democratic countries may prefer
secrecy. This is illustrated in statements made by former British Prime Minister
Tony Blair, in his 2010 memoir. Expressing his regret at supporting Britain’s
freedom of information law, Mr. Blair wrote: “You idiot. You naïve, foolish,
irresponsible nincompoop. There is really no description of stupidity, no matter
how vivid, that is adequate. I quake at the imbecility of it . . . . For political leaders,
it’s like saying to someone who is hitting you over the head with a stick, ‘Hey, try
this instead,’ and handing them a mallet.” TONY BLAIR, A JOURNEY: MY
POLITICAL LIFE 511-12 (2010).
4. See, e.g., Thomas Bernauer & Vally Koubi, Taking Firms and Markets
Seriously: A Study on Bank Behavior, Market Discipline, and Regulation (Ctr. for
Comparative & Int’l Studies, Working Paper No. 26, 2006) (examining regulations
of the U.S. banking sector during the 1990s and concluding that these regulations
increased transparency within the sector, which in turn enhanced competition
among banks both within the United States and worldwide because banks’
compliance (or non-compliance) with strict capital requirements was made a
matter of public record). The subsequent 2008 financial crisis demonstrated that
important information regarding market risks were not transparent.
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of market failure: incomplete or unavailable information.
Second, governments can impose transparency requirements on
private participants in the market, such as reporting requirements
regarding the sale of securities, or labeling requirements for products
and disclosure requirements for services. These requirements address
market failures in providing information relevant to market
decisions.5
Moreover, transparency can enhance government regulation by
making regulatory standards more visible, by alerting the public to
violations of regulations, and by creating incentives for compliance. 6
The availability of information can incorporate public scrutiny as an
aspect of government regulation.
Transparency also allows a government to deal with the problem
of agency, i.e., the risk that its officials will pursue their own
interests rather than those of the government as articulated in law or
policy. Foremost in this regard are anti-corruption provisions such as
public financial disclosure. Disclosures about government activities
encourage the participation of citizens in reporting misconduct and
perhaps in helping to define the concept of ‘conflict of interest.’7
Advocates of whistleblower protection often justify transparency on
this ground.
Finally, transparency can improve administration by encouraging
the bureaucratic self-assessment that is likely to accompany the
collection, organization, and disclosure of information. The criticism
that follows public access can improve agency research and analysis
5. See Eric T. Swanson, Have Increases in Federal Reserve Transparency
Improved Private Sector Interest Rate Forecasts?, 38 J. MONEY, CREDIT, &
BANKING 791 (2006) (evaluating extensively the effect of increases in Federal
Reserve transparency from 1990 through 2003 on the ability of private financial
companies to predict short term interest rates, and concluding that increased
transparency led to improvements in private sector predictions of performance).
6. E.g., GEORGE KOPITS & JON CRAIG, INT’L MONETARY FUND,
TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 2-4 (1998), available at
http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/158/op158.pdf (focusing on fiscal transparency
and asserting that such transparency is constructive for both the economy and
society because transparency exposes “unsustainable” governmental policies and
enhances public trust in government by creating a “well-informed electorate”).
7. Public financial disclosures place the responsibility for the determination of
conflict-of-interest standards with the public. ROBERT G. VAUGHN, CONFLICT-OFINTEREST REGULATION IN THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE BRANCH 52-53 (1979).

2011]

TRANSPARENCY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF LAWS

973

as well as agency practices and procedures.
However, several aspects of transparency can limit how well these
provisions improve administration. One of these aspects is the
information cost problem created by access to too much information,
a problem often identified with labeling requirements where the
value of each piece of information decreases as more information is
disclosed.8 In addition, the value of transparency involves more than
the availability of information. When information is available is often
as important as whether it is available.
Because the above justifications conceive of transparency as an
instrument, transparency has worth only as far as it is perceived to
further a value in administration. Moreover, that determination, that
exercise of discretion, is made by government officials within a
particular bureaucracy. Recent evaluations of transparency
demonstrate the difficulty of measuring it. For example, the
Collaboration on Government Secrecy attempts to measure success
by assigning a “grade” to Obama’s transparency initiatives,9 while
others look to a host of different, oft-criticized “transparency
indexes.”10 In short, transparency assessments can vary depending on
whether they focus on access to records, information, opinions, or
policy.

B. TRANSPARENCY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT
A different justification for transparency emphasizes these
8. E.g., ‘Information overload’ feared ahead of vote on food labelling,
EURACTIV (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.euractiv.com/en/health/informationoverload-feared-ahead-vote-food-labelling-news-301207 (reporting on proposed
food labeling legislation by the European Commission and noting that “[t]here is a
general concern that the proliferation of labelling . . . will undermine efforts to
share simple information with the public”).
9. One such grade can be found on the website of the Collaboration on
Government Secrecy. COLLABORATION ON GOVERNMENT SECRECY,
http://www.wcl.american.edu/lawandgov/cgs/about.cfm (last visited July 1, 2011).
10. E.g., William De Maria, Measurements and Markets: Deconstructing the
Corruption Perception Index, 21 INT’L J. PUB. SECTOR MGMT. 777, 777-90 (2008)
(criticizing the commonly relied upon “corruption perception index” issued by one
non-governmental organization—Transparency International—as a flawed
measure of countries’ transparency because it does not measure actual levels of
corruption or actual lack of transparency, instead focusing on perception of
corruption, and uses paternalistic definitions of corruption in its measurements that
tend to ignore cultural differences unique to each country).
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provisions as supporting open government and democratic
accountability. In a democratic state, the public has a right to know
about the actions of government institutions and officials.
Information is necessary if citizens are to hold government officials
and institutions legally accountable for misconduct or error. Such
information is also the foundation of political accountability.11
Information enables citizens to organize and to seek changes in
government policy or to use democratic procedures to change
government policies or elected representatives, and to seek the
removal of persons directing government administration.
Given the importance of transparency to democratic
accountability, it is not a coincidence that the majority of freedom of
information and whistleblower protections laws have been adopted
since the fall of the Soviet Union.12 Many of these laws have been
enacted in states formerly part of the Soviet Union or within its
sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.13
11. An often repeated quote by James Madison, fourth President of the United
States, captures this notion. Madison said: “A popular Government, without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a
tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people
who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.” Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, in 3 LETTERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
276 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1867). Moreover, John Adams, second
President of the United States, a decade before the revolution of 1776, wrote:
And liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people, who
have a right, from the frame of their nature, to knowledge, as their great Creator, who
does nothing in vain, has given them understandings, and a desire to know; but besides
this, [citizens] have a right, an indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible, divine right to
that most dreaded and envied kind of knowledge, I mean, of the characters and
conduct of their rulers.

A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS,
SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 456 (Boston, Charles C. Little &
James Brown 1851).
12. John M. Ackerman & Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion
of Freedom of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 97-98, 112-13 (2006)
(explaining that freedom of information laws passed by newly formed
democracies, such as the post-Soviet states, Spain, and Thailand, tend to be strong
and far-reaching because they are often passed in “reaction to previous
authoritarian rule”).
13. Id. at 112 (commenting that Hungary and Ukraine were the first of the postSoviet states to pass freedom of information laws after the collapse of the Soviet
Union).
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This justification can also support laws that encourage or require
the disclosure of information by persons in the private sector. For
example, private sector employees may be aware of the corruption of
government officials. Disclosures by private sector employees
regarding product safety violations or corporate fraud or misconduct
support government regulation but they also identify weaknesses in
government administration or in the applicable laws—an
identification likely to lead to changes through legal or political
accountability.14 In this regard, transparency obligations applicable to
the private sector support open government and democratic
accountability.
Yet, disclosures can undermine accountability. The information
cost problem discussed earlier applies here as well. Selective
disclosures of limited or partial information as well as inaccurate
information can flood the information marketplace, thwarting
accountability.15 The development and applications of standards for
the exercise of discretion regarding disclosures often lie in the hands
of those officials most at risk from such disclosures. As noted, the
timing of disclosure alters the importance and the meaning of what is
disclosed. Requirements for transparency can influence the standards
for collecting and retaining potential embarrassing information. The
scandal regarding the email practices of the Bush White House is one
recent example.16
These justifications regarding open government and democratic
14. See, e.g., Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61
TAX LAW. 357, 359, 371-72 (asserting that enhanced enforcement of tax laws by
private actors would serve a “powerful monitoring” function where there is a lack
of enforcement by public officials).
15. See generally Jerry Brito, Hack, Mash & Peer: Crowdsourcing
Government Transparency, 9 COLUM. SCI & TECH. L. REV. 120, 122-27 (2008)
(criticizing the U.S. government for its failure to disclose significant amounts of
allegedly public data via the internet and for the poor accessibility and
searchability of the government’s data that does appear online). By making the
public aware of the government’s activities, it is more likely that the government
will be held accountable for such actions. See id. at 157.
16. See Millions of Missing Bush Admin. E-mails Found, MSNBC.COM (Dec. 14,
2009, 6:55 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34419592/ns/politics/ (reporting
the recovery of twenty-two million emails that the Bush White House failed to
properly record and preserve and positing that the recovered emails will not be
publicly available until 2014 because they must be subjected to the “National
Archives’ process for releasing presidential and agency records”).

976

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[26:4

accountability carry weight within democratic states but, even in
these states, that weight can be influenced by the character of state
obligations. The more expansive the role of the state in the
vindication of social and economic rights, the broader the scope of
transparency provisions necessary to hold the government
accountable. Furthermore, the broad scope of transparency
provisions will sweep in many private-sector institutions and actors.

C. TRANSPARENCY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Finally, international human rights support transparency
provisions, such as freedom of information and whistleblower
statutes, as well as the requirement that governments disseminate
information. The most commonly referenced of these human rights is
the right to freedom of expression. Perhaps the best known
articulation of this human right is Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.17 Article 13 of the American
Convention of Human Rights18 is similar. Applying the American
Convention, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has
determined that Article 13 imposes an affirmative obligation on
governments to provide a mechanism by which persons can acquire
information about government activities.19 The Court believed that
the right of free expression includes the right to acquire and to
receive information.20
17. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 19,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through nay
media and regardless of frontiers.”).
18. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (providing
for the “right to freedom of thought and expression,” mandating respect for such
right, and limiting the means by which governments and private actors may
permissibly restrict it).
19. See Claude Reyes v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶¶ 86-87 (Sept. 19, 2006) (“[F]or the
individual to be able to exercise democratic control, the State must guarantee
access to the information of public interest that it holds.”). Petitioner Reyes was an
economist working for a non-governmental organization interested in obtaining
information regarding sustainable development. Reyes sought but was denied
access to information held by the Chilean government regarding a forestry project
approved by the Chile’s Foreign Investment Committee. See id. ¶¶ 3, 49.
20. Id. ¶¶ 75-77.
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As with other justifications, the human rights framework for the
free flow of information also supports anti-corruption transparency
provisions. The model whistleblower law drafted for the Office of
Legal Cooperation of the Organization of American States—to
enforce the whistleblower provision of the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption—explicitly recognizes the
connection between transparency and human rights, particularly the
right of freedom of expression.21 Corruption often leads to human
rights violations because government officials use the power of the
state to sustain corruption or to silence critics.
A human rights justification emphasizes the conduct of
government officials. It permits advocates of transparency to draw on
existing organizations and procedures intended to protect and to
advance human rights. Human rights are universal in that they are
rights that attach to human beings simply because of their humanity.
Freedom of expression is a universal right but societies may apply it
differently given their culture and their needs.22 The right of freedom
of expression is a value in and of itself. For this reason, human rights
are a less instrumentalist justification for transparency.

21. See Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption art. 3, ¶ 8, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO.
105-39, 35 I.L.M. 724 (requiring states parties to “create, maintain and strengthen .
. . [s]ystems for protecting public servants and private citizens who, in good faith,
report acts of corruption”); see also ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES MODEL
LAW PROTECTING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AGAINST CORRUPTION art. 1 (2002),
available at http://www.whistleblower.org/storage/documents/OAS_Model_Law
_and_Explanatory_Notes.pdf (“The purpose of this law is to implement Article III,
Section 8 of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption by protecting
those public servants and private citizens who exercise their human right to
freedom of expression, by acting on their duty to disclose and challenge
corruption.”); Robert G. Vaughn, Thomas Devine & Keith Henderson, The
Whistleblower Statute Prepared for the Organization of American States and the
Global Legal Revolution Protecting Whistleblowers, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
857-73 (2003) (describing the development of the O.A.S. model whistleblower law
and providing explanations of and justifications for its key provisions).
22. See generally Vaughn, Devine & Henderson, supra note 21, at 873-97
(surveying whistleblower protection laws in a number of countries, including the
United States, Canada, Australia, Great Britain, South Africa, and Sweden, and
comparing them to the O.A.S. model law).
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II. DIFFERING VIEWS OF ADMINISTRATION
Differing views of administration influence the application of
justifications for transparency because these views propose
conflicting purposes for administration. A description of these
differing views relies on the work of two administrative law scholars,
Thomas Sargentich and Gerald Frug.23 Although they write from
different perspectivesone from liberal theory and the other from
critical legal studies—they have similar conceptions of these views
of administration. The following description summarizes their
viewpoints but does not capture the complexity or subtleties of their
work.
Both theories identify the exercise of discretion as a central
problem of administration. How do we justify and control this
discretion; how do we convince ourselves that we have nothing to
fear from bureaucracy? In regard to the limitations of the power of
bureaucracies, Sargentich refers to the “ideals” of administrative
lawthe Rule of Law Ideal, the Public Purposes Ideal, and the
Democratic Process Ideal.24

A. THE RULE OF LAW
The Rule of Law Ideal limits administrative discretion through
statutes, regulations, or other standards.25 To be an effective
23. See In Memory of Tom Sargentich, AM. U. WASH. C. OF L.,
http://www.wcl.american.edu/llmlawandgov/tom_sargentich.cfm (last visited July
1, 2011) (recognizing one of Sargentich’s greatest accomplishments as the founder
and director of the LL.M. Program on Law and Government at the American
University Washington College of Law); Gerald E. Frug, HARVARD L. SCH.,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/index.html?id=22 (last visited July 1,
2011) (delineating Frug’s research and career interests in legal problems in local
government and legal theory); see Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in
American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984) (introducing and critiquing
justifications for the large scale bureaucracy that characterizes both administrative
and corporate legal systems).
24. E.g., Thomas O. Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative
Process: The Contemporary Debate, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 385 (contending that
administrative law reform centers around these conflicting “ideals,” which provide
a framework through which the administrative process can be understood and
improved).
25. Id. at 397, 399. The author focused specifically on limitations imposed by
the non-delegation doctrine followed in the United States, which prohibits
Congress from shirking its responsibility to legislate by permitting agencies to
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limitation, the applicable rules and standards must be known.
Therefore, transparency provisions, particularly freedom of
information provisions, abhor secret law. In some countries the
greatest benefit of freedom of information provisions is, perhaps, the
availability of the standards guiding administrative action.26
Transparency provisions must also grapple with the issue of
discretion. How much discretion should be given to administrative
officials to withhold documents or information and what standards
should guide that discretion? In addition, approaches to interpretation
of these standards by administrative officials and by the courts or
other institutions also introduce discretion into the application of
selected standards.27

B. PUBLIC PURPOSES
The Public Purposes Ideal emphasizes the policymaking and
discretionary choices of administrators.28 While the Rule of Law
Ideal shuns discretion, the Public Purpose Ideal embraces it.
Administrators must act in the public interest and such action
requires the exercise of discretion. That discretion is limited by the
expertise of administrators and by the standards used to determine
the public good. In the United States, these standards have, over the
last three decades, increasingly come to involve the application of
some form of cost-benefit analysis. 29 Sargentich and Frug, however,
engage in legislative functions. See id. at 400-01.
26. See, e.g., id. at 387-89 (surveying instances of administrative reform in the
United States where standards trumped discretion, including the Supreme Court’s
invalidation of the legislative veto and pronouncement that laws controlling
administrative agencies must be “adopted in a manner consistent with [the
Constitution’s] bicameralism and presentation requirements”). But see Kenneth
Culp Davis, Informal Administrative Action: Another View, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 836,
838-40 (1977) (expressing frustration about the difficulty inherent in striking a
balance between standards and discretion, but ultimately acknowledging that
standards provide important “guidance” to those in command).
27. See Davis, supra note 26, at 839 (specifying that the administrator of a
standard must not only decide whether the rule will allow or require officers to
exercise discretion, but also whether the standard will limit such discretion by
delineating those limitations).
28. See Sargentich, supra note 24, at 411.
29. See William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in
Administrative Law—Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV.
171, 176 (2009) (making clear that governments have implemented cost-benefit
analysis into the administrative lawmaking process to ensure a “net-benefit” to
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criticize expertise and cost-benefit analyses as ineffective limitations
on the exercise of administrative discretion.30
Moreover, this view of administration incorporates secrecy as a
central value. Secrecy permits deliberations based on expertise and
rational analysis. Thus, the deliberative process privilege and
executive privilege are protections of the candid discussions needed
in policy making. Secrecy also insulates this rational, expert process
from improper political interference.
Transparency provisions, as an aspect of administration, confront
the same weaknesses of the Public Purpose Ideal. For example, a
focus on the clearinghouse function of government and the
obligation of the government to organize and disseminate
information relies on expertise and cost-benefit analysis.31 Likewise,
the need to centralize information policy and the importance of the
management and administration of information stress expertise and
policy analysis in the hands of administrators.

society and limit needless and wasteful costs); Sargentich, supra note 24, at 412-13
(admitting that cost-benefit analysis is a “valuable tool[] for justifying and
criticizing administrative decision making,” where it is often employed, such as in
rulemaking); see also Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative
Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 416-17 (1981) (commenting on the “infiltrat[ion]” of
cost-benefit analysis throughout the administrative law framework and clarifying
that the cost-benefit practice began with the Carter and Regan administrations in
the United States, but has become so common that certain statutes now require it).
30. Frug, supra note 23, at 1349-51 (framing judicial “‘balancing’” tests that
compare “the interests of the individual affected by bureaucracy [with] the
interests of the bureaucracy itself” as cost-benefit analyses). These tests, according
to Frug, do not actually provide guidance to courts, but instead force courts to
make determinations about the individualized findings of fact with regards to the
interests involved. Id.; see also Sargentich, supra note 24, at 416-19 (denouncing
cost-benefit analysis as unrealistic because it purports to be rational but requires
the impossible task of considering all possible consequences of a particular action,
and can be distorted by comparing set costs against abstract benefits such as public
goods).
31. See Sargentich, supra note 24, at 402, 420-21 (acknowledging that the
structure of the U.S. administrative law system permits a large amount of agency
discretion and, with respect to disclosure regulation, takes important “externalities”
into account where the government must determine how much information to
release to the public in a particular situation in order to let the public make its own,
rational, and informed decisions).
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C. DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
The Democratic Process Ideal limits discretion through the
application of the political process to administration. Politics can be
introduced into administration through direct public participation in
administrative decisions or through the intervention of state officials
with broader responsibilities to the government and to its citizens.32
Direct participation poses several difficulties. These difficulties
flow from the need to determine who participates and how they do
so. These determinations will be made by administrators whose
discretion is to be controlled by these participants. An oversight
model raises some of the same issues.
Participation in either of these applications of politics by
individuals or non-governmental groups requires information. If
control of discretion through politics requires information,
transparency provisions must be sensitive to “information equity”
that all groups affected by administrative decisions will have
sufficient information to participate in the political process.33 Many
highly regarded transparency laws fall short under the standard of
information equity.
Transparency provisions rarely provide for participation or
establish a right to participation, and thus do not address or articulate
standards for participation.34 A critic could conceive transparency as
a weak substitute for participation or, in other words, information as
a bureaucratic substitute for influence.

32. See id. at 425-28 (clarifying that the Democratic Process Ideal focuses on
the need for a representative government and stresses the importance of public
participation in the political process because both help to hold government officials
responsible and ensure that administrative agencies will more effectively take
citizens’ interests into account).
33. This emphasis on “information equity” may be less about egalitarian values
and more about ensuring political control of bureaucratic discretion. If the political
process serves to limit discretion, then all groups affected by such discretion
require the information necessary to participate in that process.
34. See, e.g., Funk, supra note 29, at 171-72 (noting that Ireland’s refusal to
sign on to the Lisbon treaty signaled the beginning of a revolt against the European
Union’s practice of fostering neither transparency nor participation). But see id. at
182-97 (examining in detail three U.S. laws that provide for participation and
transparency in rulemaking proceedings: the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
Government in the Sunshine Act, and Negotiated Rulemaking Act).
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CONCLUSION
Justifications for transparency and views of administration of laws
are clearly related to one another. The explication of that relationship
begins with recognition of the common thread that administrative
discretion weaves through both. This explication will surely vary
from one country to another and will rely heavily upon the insights
of comparative law and comparative analysis.
This article ends with a few general observations about the
connections between justifications for transparency and views of
administration.
(1) Transparency is linked to contemporary debates about
administration.35
(2) Transparency, like administration, is concerned with the
problem of the exercise of discretion.36
(3) Transparency and administration incorporate perspectives that
necessarily conflict with one another.
(4) Transparency and administration help to identify many
differing perspectives, to illuminate conflicts and choices otherwise
obscured, to remind us of the limits of any single approach, and to
highlight the compromises and frustrations that cannot be avoided.
(5) The meaning of the terms ‘transparency’ and ‘administration’
shift with the perspectives from which they are examined.
(6) Not all views of transparency and administration can guide the
future; no particular vision of transparency and administration can be
fully adopted.
(7) Important tasks of comparative analysis are to describe
suppressed normative visions and to recognize the conflicts of values
that might otherwise be lost in discussions of transparency.

35. See generally id. at 172-77, 197-98 (presenting a brief synopsis of
transparency developments within the U.S. administrative law system and
ultimately concluding that an effective administrative system, in the United States
or any other country, cannot be achieved without transparency and, in turn, the
participation of interested parties).
36. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.

